Automatic imitation refers to the automatic tendency to imitate observed actions. Previous research 27 on automatic imitation has linked it to a wide variety of social cognitive processes and functions, 28 although the evidence is mixed and suggestive. However, no study to date has looked at the 29 downstream behavioural effects of automatic imitation. The current research addresses this gap in 30 the literature by exploring the possible relationship between trait-levels of automatic imitation, as 31 measured by the automatic imitation task (AIT) and explicit prosocial behaviours, as measured by 32 a modified dictator game (DG). Contrary to our expectations, AIT effects did not correlate with 33 DG scores. This conclusion is supported by both equivalence tests and Bayesian analysis.
Given the lack of a priori information regarding the relationship between AIT effects and the DG, 140 it is difficult to make strong predictions about the direction of the possible effect. One hypothesis 141 can be inferred from work by Leighton et al. (2010) who showed that priming participants to a 142 prosocial state, as compared to anti-social or neutral states, led to larger AIT effects (e.g., slower 143 reaction times during incongruent trials). Based on this, it is possible that DG scores (i.e., how 144 much money a participant gives away) will positively correlate with AIT effects, such that the 145 more money a participant gives away, the more likely they had slower reaction times and/or made 146 more errors during the incongruent trials of the automatic imitation task. However, work by Muller 147 et al. (2013) suggests the opposite prediction. They report that, at least for attractive targets, the 148 smaller the AIT effects, the higher participants scored on the empathic concern and perspective 149 taking scales of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (a self-report inventory indexing trait-levels of 150 empathy; Davis, 1980; 1983) . Given the oft posited connection between empathy and altruism (e.g., Batson, 2011) , this line of evidence suggests that DG scores may negatively correlate with 152 AIT effects, such that the more money a participant gives away, the more likely they had faster 153 reaction times and/or made less errors during the incongruent trials of automatic imitation task.
155
Of course, given the reviewed null results questioning the link between AIT effects and social 156 cognitive factors (Cracco et al., 2018a; Newey et al., 2019; Butler et al., 2015; Darda et al., 2019), 157 it is also possible that AIT effects will show no association with DG scores. Furthermore, in a 158 recent study, Genschow et al. (2017) had their participants complete both a motor mimicry task 159 and the AIT, and while they successfully found the expected results in each paradigm, participants' 160 performance in both tasks did not correlate with one another; however, it should be noted that, 161 while the AIT showed high internal reliability, the motor mimicry task did not. As such, 162 correlations with scores obtained from the motor mimicry task is difficult (or maybe even 163 impossible) to interpret. With that said, however, this means that there is a lack of empirical 164 evidence supporting the link between automatic imitation and motor mimicry (also see Obhi, 165 2016). As such, while motor mimicry seems to be related to prosocial behaviours, this fact alone 166 does not provide information about the relationship between automatic imitation and prosocial 167 behaviours (and we cannot thereby use one to make predictions about the other).
169
Given the state of knowledge, it may be unwise to make a directional prediction regarding the 170 relationship between AIT effects and DG scores. In fact, as made explicit in our pre-registration 171 form, we planned two-tailed analyses for the hypothesis that AIT effects are associated (in some 172 form) with DG scores. Furthermore, supplementary Bayesian analysis and Equivalence tests will 173 be used in the case of a null finding. Lastly, we also included self-report inventories oft used to measure trait-levels of empathy: The
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Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980; 1983) and the Questionnaire for Cognitive and 177 Affective Empathy (QCAE; Reniers et al., 2011) . Empathy is colloquially understood as the ability 178 to both share and understand the thoughts and emotions of others; nevertheless, there are a number 179 of different and (sometimes) overlapping definitions/conceptualizations/operationalization of 180 empathy (e.g., Batson, 2009 ). However, a common distinction is often made between the cognitive 181 and affective components of empathy (e.g., Rameson & Lieberman, 2009; Tremblay et al., 2018; 182 Galang et al., 2019) . Affective empathy refers to the emotional sharing, or "resonating", between 183 the subject and object of empathy; cognitive empathy, on the other hand, refers to a person's ability 184 to engage in self-other processing such as being able to take the perspective of others and/or 185 "mentalize". Both the IRI and QCAE take this multi-component view of empathy and are 186 separately measured by subscales in each inventory (see methods section). These questionnaires 
Methods
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The pre-registration form of this study can be found at: aspredicted.org/uh3mv.pdf. It should be noted 194 that we originally intended to deceive participants in the modified DG by not actually giving away 195 money to others. However, before data collection began, we opted to remove this deception (by 196 actually giving away money). via an a priori power analysis (using G*Power; Faul et al., 2007; 2009) showing that n = 84 202 provides 80% power for detecting a correlation of r = 0.3 (medium effect size). As per our 203 exclusion criteria, 2 participants were removed and replaced due to indicating their suspicions 204 about the deception method used in the study and 1 participant for making too many errors during 205 the automatic imitation task (>65% error; our pre-registration specified that we would remove and 206 replace any participant that made more than 50% error). As these participants were replaced, the 207 sample size remained at n = 84. Prior to participation, participants provided written informed 208 consent. The study was approved by the McMaster Research Ethics Board (MREB). 
Participants
Automatic Imitation Task 215
To gain a measure of automatic imitation, participants completed the automatic imitation task 216 (AIT). The AIT used in this study is based on the method used by Brass et al. (2000) . Participants 217 were instructed to hold down the "V" and "B" keys using their right index and middle fingers, up on the screen. Crucially, a hand in the background of the screen moved a finger congruent (e.g.,
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"1" and index finger lift) or incongruent (e.g., "1" and middle finger lift) to the task-relevant cue.
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Participants were explicitly told to ignore the hand movements. To minimize spatial-compatibility 223 effects, the stimuli were rotated by 90 degrees (Cracco et al., 2018a) . The main dependent variables 224 for the AIT effect are reaction times and error rates. Note that the experimenter was present in the 225 room while participants completed this task. See Figure 1a . 
Dictator Game 262
To gain a measure of prosocial behaviour, we opted to use a modified version of the Dictator Game 263 (DG) recently implemented by Christov-Moore & Iacoboni (2016). In our own modified version 264 of this task, participants were told that they will be seeing twelve faces on the screen, one by one, 265 and that at each face they will have to decide how much money they are willing to give away to 266 the other person (between $0-10, in intervals of $1) (see Figure 1b ). They were further told that 267 the amount of money they will be given at the end of the experiment will be equivalent to the 268 average amount they decide to keep for themselves. Thus, our measure of prosocial behaviour is 269 the amount of money, on average, they were willing to give away. The faces were evenly split between Caucasian, Black, and Asian faces, and further split by gender, to both follow Christov-Moore & Iacoboni (2016), and to better represent the multicultural makeup 273 of the city in which data was collected. These faces are presented with a neutral expression and 274 were taken from the Chicago Face Database (Ma et al., 2015) . To better engage the participants, 275 and again following Christov-Moore & Iacoboni (2016), we told the participants that at least half 276 the faces represented real people that we have contacted around the city and that each person will 277 get the amount specified by the participant (note that this was not a deception, and we did in fact 278 do as such). Furthermore, to mitigate possible demand characteristics, we informed the participants 279 that a research assistant (blind to the purpose of the study -including why the participant is getting 280 paid a certain amount) would distribute the funds at the end of the experiment. This latter part was 281 a deception, and participants were informed and had a chance to re-consent to the study at the end 282 of the session. The experimenter was not present in the room while participants completed this 283 task. Two participants were removed and replaced due to being skeptical of the made-up research 284 assistant and/or that the money was going towards real people. 
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PT reflects the tendency or ability to adopt the point of view of other people, FA reflects the 292 tendency to transpose or identify strongly with fictional characters (in movies, plays, books, etc.),
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EC reflects the tendency to experience feelings of warmth, compassion and concern for others 294 undergoing negative experiences, and lastly, PD reflects the amount of discomfort and anxiety that Participants first read over a letter of information going over the tasks in the study. If they were 311 comfortable with the procedures, they were asked to sign a consent form. Participants always 312 completed the three tasks in the following order: AIT → DG → Empathy Questionnaires. We 313 chose this specific order of tasks to minimize carry over effects. Whereas completing the DG 314 before the AIT may have influenced the AIT effects (e.g., the DG may act as a pro-or anti-social 315 prime; Leighton et al., 2010), we thought it less likely that conducting the AIT would influence 316 the DG (as it would be difficult to know how "well" one is doing on the AIT for there to be any 317 priming to occur, nor is there evidence to suggest that completing the AIT influences subsequent 318 Page 14 of 31 tasks). Likewise, the questionnaires were given at the end to minimize any carry over effects that 319 might influence the primary tasks. The fact that the questionnaires may be influenced by carryover 320 effects from the DG is addressed in our discussion. In the AIT, participants first read over the 321 instructions described above. Afterwards, they were given 8 practice trials with feedback ("error" 322 if they made an incorrect movement; "too slow" if they took longer than 1000ms to respond) to 323 make sure they understood the instructions. They were then informed that the main trials would 324 not provide feedback. The main trials consisted of four blocks with 60 trials each. This led to a 325 total of 240 trials, wherein 120 trials were congruent or incongruent. Congruent and incongruent 326 trials were randomly intermixed within each block. Self-paced breaks were interleaved between 327 each block. The trial structure of the AIT was as follows: first, a still picture of the hand (palm-328 down) was presented and remained on the screen randomly between 800ms to 2400ms (at 200ms 329 intervals). The imperative cue ("1" or "2") would then appear after this period. 34ms after the 330 imperative cue is shown, a new picture of the hand with the finger (index or middle) half-way up 331 is shown, and 34ms after that the finger is fully extended up. Visually, this showed the hand move 332 its index or middle finger in an upward motion.
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After the AIT, participants completed the DG. The DG began with the experimenter instructing 335 the participant about the procedures (described above). The faces were randomly shown for each 336 participant. Each face appeared on the left-hand side of the screen. On the right-hand side, the 337 participant was prompted with the question "How much money are you willing to give him/her?", 338 with the options between 0-$10 (at $1 intervals). Participants could choose the amount by clicking 339 on the number on the screen via the mouse. After each click, there was a 500ms delay before the 340 next face appeared.
At the end of the DG, participants completed the IRI And QCAE (counterbalanced per participant).
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Lastly, at the end of the overall study, participants were debriefed about the study (and given a 344 chance to re-consent once the deception was revealed). We implemented a funnel debrief 345 procedure, beginning with general questions and ending with more specific questions about the 346 true nature of the study, to probe whether participants saw through the deception (two participants 347 were removed and replaced as a result). Participants were then given the amount of money owed 348 to them depending on their choices during the DG. 
Equivalence Tests 432
Within a frequentist framework, it is impossible to show that the null hypothesis (i.e., the effect 433 size = 0) is true (Lakens, 2017); however, it is possible to statistically reject effect sizes between 434 pre-determined lower and upper bounds and theoretically conclude that the effect size is close 435 enough to zero for practical purposes. One way to do this is via the use of equivalence tests 436 (Lakens, 2017; Lakens et al., 2018) . Given that the current study was powered to detect r = 0.3, An alternative to the equiveillance test is the use of Bayes Factors (BF) to look at the relative 455 probability of the alternative versus null hypotheses. As a BF is calculated by the taking the ratio 456 between the probability of the alternative hypothesis, given the observed data, and the probability 457 of the null hypothesis, given the observed data, then a BF can tell us how probable the null 458 hypothesis is relative to the alternative (and vice versa; e.g., Dienes, 2011; 2014) . BF10 refers to 459 the relative probability of the alternative over the null and BF01 indicates the inverse. To perform 460 this analysis, we used JASP (ver. 0.9; JASP team, 2018). As we did not have an informed prior to 461 rely on, we opted to use the default prior set by JASP (i.e., a Beta distribution centred at 0 with a 462 width of 1).
For the correlation between AIT reaction time effects and DG scores, the Bayesian analysis 465 indicates that BF01 = 5.3. For the correlation between AIT error effects and DG scores, the 466 Bayesian analysis indicates that BF01 = 7.3. This suggests that the null hypothesis in the former is 467 5.3 times more likely than the alternative, and the null hypothesis in the latter is 7.3 times more 468 likely than the alternative. BF > 3 is considered "substantial" evidence for the hypothesis in EC: r = -0.08, p = 0.47; FS: r = 0.02, p = 0.85] effects. However, consistent with Christov-Moore
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& Iacoboni (2016), we found that DG scores positively correlated with EC scores [r = 0.45; p < 480 0.0001; no significant results found for PD: r = 0.06, p = 0.6; PT: r = 0.2, p = 0.071; and FS: r = 481 0.024, p = 0.83]. See Figure 4a . Another worthy point to consider is that the current study may in fact be underpowered to find a 544 significant relationship between AIT effects and DG scores. We opted to power our study at 80% 545 for detecting r = 0.3 primarily due to a lack of information to help us estimate a reasonable effect 546 size for our a priori power analysis. However, it is possible that the effect may be smaller than 547 what the current study can detect; a sensitivity analysis shows that the current study can only detect 548 r = 0.2 (i.e., a small effect size) at 45% power. As such, it is possible that there is a non-zero 549 association between AIT effects and DG scores that may be pragmatically insignificant but still 550 theoretically meaningful. A correlational study using larger sample sizes will be able to test this 551 notion; however, it should be noted that the AIT, and cognitive tasks more generally, are not well 552 suited for correlational analysis (due to being designed to limit between-subjects variance; Hedge 553 et al., 2018). As such, it may be the case that a correlational approach is not appropriate and future 554 studies should instead focus on experimental manipulations to explore this topic. AIT effects and stable personality traits (e.g., Narcissism). All of this is to say that it is possible 564 that automatic imitation (indexed via the AIT), and perhaps self-other control more generally, may 565 not play such a central role in social cognitive function as often presumed. Or perhaps the AIT is 566 not measuring automatic imitation and self-other control in such a direct fashion as often assumed 567 (Ramsey, 2018). Regardless, we contend that such a negative conclusion is premature, and more 568 work is needed to fully elucidate such issues. This last point should be emphasized as we only 569 report a single experiment; and as such, strong interpretations of our null results are not warranted.
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Until more studies are conducted to confirm our findings, the current null results should be treated 571 as, at best, suggestive.
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A noteworthy limitation is the use of the modified DG as a measure of prosocial behaviour levels.
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One advantage of using this measure is that it has been recently shown to correlate with activity in 575 neural regions associated with empathic processing (Christov-Moore & Iacoboni, 2016). However,
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it should be noted that other factors outside of prosocial motivations could have influenced 577 participant choices (for a meta-analysis and review of DG, see Engel, 2011). We did, however, 578 take careful measures in minimizing possible confounds such as demand characteristics (e.g., by 579 having participants believe that the experimenter would have no knowledge of their choices). We 580 also collected the socio-economic status (SES) of participants (i.e., family yearly income, fathers' 581 education level, mothers' education level). Unfortunately, only 52/84 participants responded to all
